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From Empire to Empathy? Clinical
Collaborations Between the Global North
and the Global South-an essay in
conversation with Daniel Bonilla
James J. Silk*
Take up the White Man's burden -
And reap his old reward:
The blame of those ye better
The hate of those ye guard -
The cry of hosts ye humour
(Ah, slowly!) toward the light: -
"Why brought ye us from bondage,
Our loved Egyptian night?"
- Rudyard Kipling, "The White Man's Burden: The United States and
the Philippine Islands"
"Cursed is the man who withholds justice from the alien, the fatherless or
the widow." Then all the people shall say, "Amen!"
- Deuteronomy 2 7:19 (NIV)
Learn to do right! Seek justice, encourage the oppressed. Defend the cause
of the fatherless, plead the case of the widow.
- Isaiah 1:17 (NIV)
Clinical Professor of Law, Allard K. Lowenstein International Human Rights Clinic, and
Executive Director, Orville H. Schell, Jr. Center for International Human Rights, Yale Law
School.
I am grateful, first of all, to Daniel Bonilla for his provocative and valuable paper, the rich
conversations we had about it when he was visiting at Yale in the spring of 2011, the lively
discussion of the paper that he led with the students of the Allard K. Lowenstein International
Human Rights Clinic that semester, and the deep trust of friendship that has allowed us to
disagree and learn from each other across our geographical and cultural differences. I am also
grateful to my student Paul Linden-Retek for his insights and his patience in guiding me re-
medially through concepts about which I had only the most inchoate and elementary intui-
tions. He is officially my student but realistically, in these matters, my mentor. Finally, I want
to thank my colleague Steve Wizner for his guidance about the social-justice mission of clinical
legal education - when I started teaching fourteen years ago and when I set out to write this
paper - and for his model of steadfastness in pursuing this mission.
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. .. [Slend not to know
For whom the bell tolls,
It tolls for thee.
- John Donne, Devotions Upon Emergent Occasions, Meditation
XVII
[The artist] speaks to . . . the subtle but invincible conviction of solidarity
that knits together the loneliness of innumerable hearts, to the solidarity in
dreams, in joy, in sorrow, in aspirations, in illusions, in hope, in fear,
which binds all men to each other, which binds together all humanity - the
dead to the living and the living to the unborn.
Joseph Conrad, Preface, The Nigger of the 'Narcissus'
Show me a prison, show me a jail,
Show me a prisoner whose face has gone pale
And I'll show you a young man with so many reasons why
And there but for fortune, may go you or I.
- Phil Ochs, "There but for Fortune"
In his essay "Legal Clinics in the Global North and South: Between
Equality and Subordination," Daniel Bonilla acknowledges the value of col-
laboration between law clinics of the Global South and the Global North,
particularly the contributions these cooperative efforts can make to promot-
ing more just societies and the skills they can foster in the participating stu-
dents.' The essence of Daniel's thesis, though, is that North-South clinical
collaboration is dominated by a vertical relationship that both reflects and
reinforces a relationship of systematic Northern domination that pervades
legal academic exchange and the production, control, and use of legal
knowledge. These collaborative initiatives are examples, then, of a nearly
inevitable global neo-colonialism that shapes interactions between the
North and South. Daniel summarizes:
[M]any of these exchanges are guided by unstated background as-
sumptions that do not promote equal relationships between clinics
of the Global North and South. Rather, these unstated background
assumptions create dynamics of domination and subordination that
hinder the fulfillment of the purposes that both clinics are said to
pursue. 2
Daniel's paper offers a careful and eloquent analysis of a phenomenon
that he and others have directly experienced. His account and the princi-
1. Daniel Bonilla, Legal Clinics in the Global North and South: Between Equality and Subordination -
An Essay, 16 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEv. L.J. 176, 176-77.
2. Id. at 178.
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ples to which it leads constitute a valuable cautionary note and a guide for
anyone embarking on the kinds of collaboration he describes. I believe,
however, that his analysis is incomplete in important ways and that a fuller
account that considers not only structural, but also individualist, explana-
tions of unequal clinic-to-clinic relationships is necessary for understanding
and addressing the phenomenon comprehensively. Doing so calls upon us
to explore and ultimately embrace concepts intertwined with one upon
which Daniel's three proposed normative principles rely: the principle of
solidarity.' While Daniel's analysis relies upon this principle, it does not
focus on it in the specific context of North-South clinical collaboration. Tak-
ing solidarity-and the fundamentally linked international human rights
principle of universality-seriously provides a stronger and more essential
base for Daniel's proposed principles and may suggest additional princi-
ples.
I view the approach that I take in this essay as a complement to Daniel's
essay, rather than a critique of it. I want our essays to be in conversation
with each other. Therefore, I do not seek to offer a catalogue or scorecard of
points in Daniel's essay that are valid and valuable or those that are suscep-
tible of criticism. My starting point is admiration for the courage and in-
sight that Daniel has brought to the challenges of North-South clinical col-
laboration. Where I point to elements of his analysis that I find
troublesome, it is to suggest limitations to its generalizability and to lay a
foundation for alternative explanations or for explanations that might com-
plement Daniel's. While Daniel's essay describes three types of clinical co-
operation to illustrate his argument-fact-finding missions, consultations to
develop law clinics in the Global South, and the joint organization of con-
ferences 4 -my discussion is based exclusively on collaborative clinical ad-
vocacy projects, including fact-finding missions. I believe it is in these pro-
jects that the phenomena Daniel describes manifest themselves most
powerfully and problematically, and it is where Daniel largely develops his
thesis (it is also where my experience has been).
I am a clinical teacher and a human rights advocate. I cannot suppress
my advocates' instincts, so this essay will undoubtedly be more sermon
than description and analysis. South-North clinical project collaboration is,
to a large extent, an activity of Northern international human rights clinics
working with Southern clinics that are addressing human rights violations
and potential violations that are, for them, domestic.5 The very term "in-
3. See id. at 179, 201.
4. See id. at 196-206.
5. Daniel's paper, particularly in addressing the two other forms of cooperation, Northern con-
sultation with Southern law schools on the development of clinics and the organization of
transnational conferences, notes that North-South clinical cooperation often involves Northern
clinical faculty who are engaged in more traditional local legal services and advocacy. The
differences between the orientation and experiences of faculty whose starting point is interna-
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ternational human rights clinic" denotes the joining of two sets of values
and traditions: those of human rights and those of clinical legal education. I
will argue that these two streams of ideology flow together to insist upon
an imperative of empathy that must guide South-North clinical collabora-
tion in human rights advocacy efforts. Deviations from this imperative un-
avoidably entail, in the complex gestalt of their causes, the classic neo-
colonial structures of subordination that Daniel identifies-I take it as a
given that persistent elements of empire, colony, slavery, racism and exploi-
tation inhabit each of our individual psyches and North-South relationships
of all kinds-but these deviations are, at their core, individual failures of
empathy.
I. IS THE STRUCTURE OF NORTH-SOUTH DOMINATION AND SUBORDINATION
INEVITABLE? TAKING EXAMPLES OF EQUALITY AND MUTUALITY SERIOUSLY
The great contributions of Daniel's paper are its description of a phe-
nomenon within the diverse constellation of South-North legal academic
cooperation, its taxonomy of the three specific forms of domination and
subordination that infect such cooperative projects, and the three guiding
principles it proposes to counteract patterns of domination and subordina-
tion in cooperative ventures. The paper offers a rich explanatory theory of
a problem that Daniel and others have experienced firsthand. But the prob-
lem does not capture the entire reality of North-South clinical cooperation,
and Daniel's explanatory account is neither a full account of the problem
nor the only explanation that fits his description of the problem. Daniel
acknowledges this.
I am not claiming that these theses describe all Global North -
Global South clinical projects. I am not saying that there are no
projects where the clinics in the North and the South work as equal
partners. These ideas attempt to make explicit the theoretical and
practical tensions that I have seen in many Global North - Global
South clinical projects. They also aim to contribute to an open dis-
cussion of the problems that I have seen talked about informally by
clinical professors both in the North and the South. . . . There are, of
course, other interpretations of these dynamics.6
tional human rights and the orientation and experiences of faculty whose starting point is local
legal services in U.S. communities very likely result in different dynamics of cooperation. My
paper addresses only project-based collaboration involving North-based international human
rights clinics, and my analysis relies on the centrality of the human rights principle of univer-
sality to the goals and methods of human rights clinical advocacy and pedagogy.
6. Bonilla, supra note 1, at 180.
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I want to take up Daniel's implicit invitation to offer alternative inter-
pretations of the dynamics he describes. But what I propose is not simply
an alternative interpretation of those dynamics. It is also an attempt to do
what Daniel's paper does not do: come to serious grips with the experienc-
es that do not fit his account and consider how those "projects where the
clinics in the North and the South work as equal partners" may, in fact,
shed light on our understanding of those projects that do manifest North-
ern domination and Southern subordination.
As I said, Daniel provides a persuasive explanatory account of a phe-
nomenon that he and others have experienced-and experienced with the
sting of Northern condescension. However, the experiences that generate
his analysis constitute a limited sample of the universe of North-South clin-
ical cooperation. This sometimes results in general observations that lack
the evidence necessary to sustain them. For example, the paper exaggerates
the extent to which South-North cooperative initiatives are susceptible to a
tendency to lump, without regard for critical variations among and within
them, all law schools of the North, on one hand, and all law schools of the
South, on the other.7 Daniel's claims are theoretical, not empirical, and, as
he says, "the plausibility of [his] narrative, thus, depends on how much it
resonates with other members of the practice."8 How much it resonates
with others will, in turn, depend on where in the complex landscape of
South-North clinical collaboration those others' practices lie and the extent
to which their experience falls within the category of project-based relation-
ships that Daniel describes or among those others that he recognizes may
not fit the pattern.
My point of departure-the fork in the road where Daniel and I start
along different paths-is precisely the importance of taking seriously the
counter-examples that Daniel does not explore. Those "projects where the
clinics in the North and the South work as equal partners" do not refute
Daniel's theory of subordination and domination, but they suggest, at least,
that something more is going on and that the structural realities that Daniel
observes do not lead inescapably to vertical collaborative relationships.
They point to a need to understand what the counter-examples mean and
what distinguishes those projects that reflect the classic North-South verti-
cality from those that proceed on a basis of equality. They suggest that
Daniel's three arguments, which he names "the Production Well," "Protect-
ed Geographical Indication," and "the Effective Operator,"9 may function
7. Id. at 188-192
8. Id. at 181. The paper further states: "No doubt, we must conduct further empirical research
on the dynamics governing clinical projects of North/South cooperation. However, this study
does not attempt a quantitative review of the object of study. As an individual immersed in a
practice, I construct an interpretation of the dynamics that characterize it and offer the causes
that I think explain them." Id.
9. Id. at 185-188
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more as factors in a complex web of factors than as nearly omnipotent
structural determinants of North-South clinical relationships.
Daniel asserts that fact-finding reports are, although useful "in the ab-
stract," deeply and inherently flawed and, practically, of limited effective-
ness.10 He writes that these reports only synthesize local knowledge; they
can generate no new knowledge of local circumstances affecting human
rights. Taken one way, this seems indisputable: If, by local knowledge, we
mean local people's knowledge of their own experience, then gathering tes-
timony about that experience necessarily involves collecting local
knowledge. But Daniel is talking about a more specific meaning of local
knowledge, "local academic knowledge": the collection, analysis and un-
derstanding of experience by local legal elites." This raises a number of
concerns. It suggests that the publication of human rights reports simply
takes pre-existing knowledge and publishes it for a foreign or transnational
audience. However, even if it were true that such reports only synthesize
local knowledge, this is not itself a compelling criticism. This is what the
classic human rights fact-finding report does: It brings together knowledge
from diverse relevant sources and makes it into a compelling and reliable
story, analyzed by the standards of human rights, to use for advocacy by
bringing the facts and the issues to the attention of various audiences with
potential to influence policies and practices affecting peoples' ability to ex-
ercise their human rights. Local knowledge may be fragmented, diffuse,
diverse, and not systematically assembled locally to represent a particular
issue. Furthermore, there may be obstacles-from political to practical-to
local researchers investigating and documenting local issues.
If, however, we take the second meaning, the local knowledge amassed
by local scholars, then we must be concerned about where we draw the
boundaries between North and South. The Northern and Southern collabo-
rators undoubtedly have more in common with each other-
socioeconomically, educationally, ideologically-than the legal academics
of the Global South have in common with the vulnerable populations in
their countries whose human rights concerns are at stake in the collabora-
tive clinical enterprise. There are, to be sure, disparities between Southern
and Northern academics and their approaches and expertise, but they man-
ifest themselves to a greater or lesser extent depending on the issues, con-
texts and areas of law at stake. A well-designed project of cooperation
would comprehend differences and take advantage of the understandably
varied strengths of the cooperating parties. Failures to cooperate on a basis
of equality, then, as Daniel himself suggests in passing, are not structurall2
but a failure of design in the particular, the individual instance.
10. Id. at 197-200.
11. Id. at 198-200.
12. Id. at 200, n.96.
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Daniel recognizes aspects of North-South clinical collaboration on advo-
cacy reports that can contribute to social justice. In particular, bringing the
resources of Northern law schools, including financial resources, student
and faculty time and effort, and access to influential political elites in
Northern countries, can increase the effective attention devoted to a human
rights issue. To some extent, using resources to gain greater leverage for
achieving progressive social change provides a benign explanation of some
of the dynamic Daniel describes. But Daniel argues that often these re-
sources could be put to uses that would make more significant contribu-
tions to social justice. Without empirical evidence-or any clear potential
for developing it-this argument is purely speculative and is not about clin-
ical collaboration as much as it is about the central human rights advocacy
model generally. Furthermore, money is not always truly fungible. Clinics
exist in law schools and receive budgets to educate the law schools' stu-
dents, not to solve the world's problems based on some objectively deter-
mined priorities. This complicates the relationship between the social-
justice and pedagogical goals of clinical education generally and clinical
collaboration specifically.
II. THE INDIVIDUAL WITHIN THE NORTH-SOUTH STRUCTURE: MARCHING IN
STEP WITH PRIVILEGE AND OLD BIASES... OR RESISTING?
The tension between the goal of social justice and pedagogical goals is
inherent in clinical human rights work, A third goal that Daniel identifies,
self-interest, is also in tension with the goal of social justice, but this tension
is not similarly inherent in the enterprise of clinical collaboration. Daniel
asserts that in actual South-North collaborative projects, the goal of social
justice is subordinated to pedagogical goals and the career-advancement
goals of Northern faculty. 3 Placing individual professional advancement
on the same plane as pedagogy in shaping clinical collaboration is, howev-
er, problematic. We can easily justify the place of pedagogical concerns in
clinical-project design. While we can accept professional advancement as a
secondary benefit of project work, it would be impossible to construct an
argument for making it a legitimate primary goal that could trump or even
appreciably counterbalance either social-justice or pedagogical goals. It is a
matter of raw self-interest, and self-interest knows no geographical bound-
aries. It can assert itself in projects of South-South or North-North collabo-
ration as easily as it can in projects of North-South collaboration. 14 Self-
13. Id. at 206-10.
14. This is a good point at which to reiterate the inevitable but varying role of a historical
North-South hierarchy in forming the attitudes of individual actors from the North and the
South. I do not want to suggest that any of us, whether from the North or from the South, is
free of predispositions that likely affect the ways in which we seek to realize our interests and
our tendencies to use some relationships to advance them more readily than we use others.
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interest operates powerfully whether we seek to understand it in psycho-
logical or philosophical terms, and geography is an insignificant factor in
nurturing or constraining it. To understand more fully failures of coopera-
tion, we must explore not only the factor of an enduring structural North-
South dynamic, but also the factor of individual outlook, individual differ-
ences in one's perspective on the relationship between the self and the
world or "the other."
From this perspective, then, the focal issue is that Daniel's paper sug-
gests, at least, that the North-South structural explanation of failures of
equality in North-South clinical collaboration is adequate and complete
while the factor of self-interest that Daniel observes tells us that a full un-
derstanding of such failures requires us to look at the individual dimen-
sion. How we understand unbalanced cooperative relationships affects
how we respond to them. Ensuring equality in South-North collaboration
requires us to think about how individual deviation from norms that, I
want to argue, are inherent in international human rights clinical education
may account for failures of cooperation. In the relationship that constitutes
any single North-South clinical collaboration, it may be difficult to ascertain
the broad theoretical construct of North-South institutional dynamics at
play. Rather, we will see a complex web of factors specific to the particular
relationship. It may include memories or vestiges or reverberations of
North-South domination and subordination, but that verticality is now a
matter of the individual psyche and, like the racism and sexism within us
all, mediated in every individual by her own complex constellation of atti-
tudes, insecurities, commitments and interests. The historical North-South
structural relationship is part of who we are and operates more as a matter
of individual psychology than as a set of governing social rules, and we
need to address it on those terms. That may mean that it is not significantly
at play in some South-North relationships, where circumstances, including
the personalities, experiences and ambitions of the clinical faculty involved,
erase or even reverse the direction of subordination.
To have a more complete understanding of the dynamics of South-
North clinical cooperation, we need to understand what happens both
when collaborative projects fail and when they work. Our understanding
of projects that succeed in operating on a basis of equality and mutuality
emerges from understanding how principles of human rights and of clinical
education converge. When Daniel acknowledges that cooperative work be-
tween clinics of the North and South is desirable because they reflect and
support the principle of solidarity,15 he is gesturing toward this essential
conjunction. But he does not explore the internal logic and the demands
that the principle of solidarity creates for clinical cooperation to advance
15. Bonilla, supra note 1, at 179.
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human rights. This conjunction produces the imperative of empathy that
the rest of this essay will discuss.
III. THE SOCIAL JUSTICE MISSION AT THE HEART OF CLINICAL LEGAL
EDUCATION: INSPIRING COMMITMENT AND EMPATHY
The enduring commitment of clinical legal education to advancing so-
cial justice-and to teaching and work that instills in students a commit-
ment to social justice-comes together in human rights clinical education
with the universalism of human rights to create an imperative of empathy.
This is an imperative not only for the advocacy approach in which we in-
doctrinate our students but also for the entire enterprise of international
human rights clinical education, including cooperation among clinics.
Daniel shortchanges the nature and value of clinical projects when he
states that cooperative projects can, in addition to contributing to more just
societies, "allow students to develop the clinical skills that are essential to
performing effectively in professional practice, such as drafting legal doc-
uments and interviewing witnesses."' 6 Although an emphasis on skills
training has accompanied the institutionalization of clinical education at
law schools of the North, 7 an inspirational purpose has remained at the
center of the clinical legal education mission. The literature on clinical edu-
cation has discussed at great length and since the early days of the "clinical
education movement" the centrality of the principle that "the public inter-
est requires law students to learn they have a social and professional re-
sponsibility to challenge injustice and to pursue social justice in society." 5
There is no need to rehearse that rich discourse here. A few samples,
though, will suggest the essence of this commitment and provide a base
from which to think about its meaning and evolution.
Stephen Wizner has written often and eloquently about the law clinic's
duty to instill a commitment of justice in law students.
We need to profess a social, political and moral agenda in our
teaching, an agenda that exposes students to the maldistribution of
wealth, power and rights in society, and that seeks to inculcate in
them a sense of their own ability and responsibility for using law to
challenge injustice by assisting the poor and the powerless. 9
16. Id. at 177.
17. See, e.g., Deena Hurwitz, Lawyering for Justice and the Inevitability of International Human
Rights Clinics, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 505, 524 (2003).
18. Stephen Wizner, The Law School Clinic: Legal Education in the Interests offustice, 70 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1929, 1929 (2002)..
19. Stephen Wizner, Beyond Skills Training, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 327, 331 (2000-2001). Wizner
quotes Jane Aiken to sharpen the distinction between mere skills teaching and the values com-
ponent of clinical education:
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With Bob Solomon, Wizner has emphasized the inherently moral and
political nature of the clinical ethos, writing that "law school clinics should
inculcate in students the professional value of representing the poor and
powerless in asserting their rights against the rich and powerful."2 0 The
omnipresence of words like "inculcate" and "instill" in the clinical litera-
ture leaves no doubt about the centrality of social-consciousness inspiration
to the clinical mission.
In her important article on the place of international human rights clin-
ics in the future of legal education, Deena Hurwitz underscores the inspira-
tional purpose that emerged with clinical education's origins in direct legal
representation. She wrote that "in international human rights we find an
extraordinary vehicle for the original social justice mission of clinical legal
education."21 She goes on to explore the diverse practice of international
human rights advocacy and to demonstrate how this practice ideally lends
itself to accomplishing all of the purposes of clinical education, including
the social-justice purpose, despite differences between human rights prac-
tice and traditional local lawyering for social justice.
When clinical legal educators invoke the social-justice mission of their
work, they generally further invoke one or more of a cluster of words:
compassion, sympathy and empathy. For example,
In order to increase the number of law school graduates who em-
brace a professional responsibility to assure access to justice for the
poor, clinicians must strive to inculcate in their students an understand-
ing and compassionate concern for the plight of people living in poverty,
and a sense of professional responsibility for increasing their access
to justice.22
These terms appear to occur in the literature largely interchangeably
and connote a constellation of emotions, attitudes, capacities and skills nec-
If all I can do in law school is to teach students skills ungrounded in a
sense of justice then at best there is no meaning to my work, and at worst,
I am contributing to the distress in the world. I am sending more people
into the community armed with legal training but without a sense of re-
sponsibility for others or for the delivery of justice in our society.
Jane Harris Aiken, Striving to Teach "Justice, Fairness and Morality," 4 CLINICAL L. REv. 1, 6 n.10
(1997).
20. Stephen Wizner & Robert Solomon, Law as Politics: A Response to Adam Babich, 11 CLINICAL
L. REV. 473, 476-77 (2004-2005).
21. Hurwitz, supra note 17, at 508. Hurwitz provides a useful survey of the history and evolu-
tion of the social-justice goal of clinical education. See id. at 523-26.
22. Stephen Wizner & Jane Aiken, Teaching and Doing: The Role of Law School Clinics in Enhanc-
ing Access to justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 997, 1011 (2004) (emphasis added).
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essary to social-justice lawyering.23 Hurwitz acknowledges and elaborates
on the need for this constellation to play a role in the international human
rights lawyering that human rights clinics teach.
Human rights lawyering, like all social justice advocacy, also re-
quires empathy. Typically, this involves being able to view the legal
system through the client's eyes, which can mean crossing a wide
metaphorical, cultural, and geographical chasm. While such advo-
cacy presumes a kind of altruism, there is at the same time an inevi-
table "otherness" to the undertaking. As such, Jane Aiken notes,
that compassion is something of a skill:
In the social justice context, the skill of compassion is the ability to
appreciate that we operate with only a partial perspective and to
recognize that many of us, law students and practicing attorneys,
have privileges - most of them not earned through any personal ef-
fort on our part - which color our perceptions both of the client and
the legal claim.
Empathic lawyering is fundamentally engaged and requires an
ability to overcome one's own needs and limitations of perspective
to experience the world as others do. More than intellectual curios-
ity, empathetic lawyering requires sympathetic identification and
knowledge of others' experiences. 24
Again, terms of empathy, compassion and sympathy are used more or
less interchangeably, and, in the clinical context, they are presented primar-
ily as a skill.
There is, ironically, a risk in invoking a capacity for compassion, empa-
thy and sympathy. The requirement that students develop and learn how
to use the skills of compassion or empathy to deal with, in the original lan-
guage of clinical education, clients who are poor-or, in broader terms, cli-
ents who are vulnerable or repressed or at the margins of society-can
come close to sounding like a kind of noblesse oblige for the legal profession,
a duty of responsibility for those who are to be anointed part of the legal
elite toward those less fortunate. Wizner quotes William Pincus, the suc-
cessful early crusader for clinical legal services for the poor in the late '60s;
the language Pincus used to describe the impact clinical education can have
23. The work of Sue Bryant and Jean Koh Peters on the "Five Habits for Cross-Cultural Law-
yering" urges lawyers to adopt a series of habits, "awareness, knowledge, and skills that en-
hance the lawyers' and clients' capacities to form meaningful relationships and to communi-
cate accurately." Sue Bryant & Jean Koh Peters, Five Habits for Cross-Cultural Lawyering, in
RACE, CULTURE, PSYCHOLOGY, & LAW, Kimberly Holt Barrett & William H. George, eds. 47, 47
(2005). One might think of the habits as providing practical content- "awareness, knowledge,
and skills" -to the concepts of compassion and empathy that the clinical literature more
broadly calls on teachers to instill in their students.
24. Hurwitz, supra note 17, at 522 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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on students hints at the way the call for law students' development of sensi-
tivity to the concerns of the poor can be read as a form of noblesse oblige.
[Clinical education] can develop in the future lawyer a sensitivity
to malfunctioning and injustice in the machinery of justice and the
other arrangements of society ... [and can enable students] to learn
to recognize what is wrong with the society around [them] - par-
ticularly what is wrong with the machinery of justice in which
[they are] participating and for which [they have] a special respon-
sibility.25
To the extent the invocation of compassion, sympathy, sensitivity to
"what is wrong with the society around [future lawyers]," and a "special
responsibility" for the workings of the legal system resonates with the ethi-
cal muddle of noblesse oblige, it tends to throw consideration of North-South
legal cooperation directly into the troubling structure of Northern domina-
tion and Southern subordination.
IV. THE FACT OF HUMAN SOLIDARITY: PURSUING THE HUMAN RIGHTS
PRINCIPLE OF UNIVERSALITY
The antidote to the instinct toward the lawyer's noblesse oblige lies in a
notion of solidarity. In this paper, I use "solidarity," a term that is put to
many different uses, to refer to a sense that a core of feelings, needs and in-
terests common to all people entails a sense of shared and linked destiny
and, thus, a duty of reciprocity to all people. Wizner pushes the usual de-
mand of compassion toward a requirement of solidarity when he writes:
Assuming the role of advocate, under proper supervision by a clin-
ical teacher, can change a student's perspective about her client and
the world in which her client lives. It can even transform the stu-
dent's view of the world and lead her to identify with her client
and with others like her client. Serving as an advocate on behalf of
a low-income client under good supervision can deepen the stu-
dent's understanding and compassion, and cause her to affirm the
common humanity she shares with her client and with others in her
client's position. 26
25. William Pincus, Educational Values in Clinical Experience for Law Students, COUNCIL LEGAL
EDUC. FOR PROF. RESP. NEWSL., Sept. 1969, at 31-32, reprinted in COUNCIL FOR LEGAL
EDUCATION FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIILITY NEWSLETTERS 1969-72, at 31-32, quoted in Wizner,
The Law School Clinic: Legal Education in the Interests of Justice, supra note 18, at 1934, n.24 (brack-
ets in original).
26. Wizner, Beyond Skills Training, supra note 20, at 328.
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One can debate the boundaries of our common humanity, but the radi-
cal fact that binds each of us to every other is our mortality and, more im-
portant, our human knowledge that the end of material life is our common
fate.
Viclev Havel's writings offer insight into why non-self-interested regard
for others is part of human reality. Havel wrote, "[Wie all share, a common
isolation, the isolation of humanity thrown into the world, [an isolation
that] injures us in the same way, regardless of who, concretely, appears to
be injured in a given instant."2 7 Our solidarity lies in our common isolation
and injury. It impels us toward identification with the Other.
The vulnerability of another person, therefore, touches us not only
because in it we recognize our own vulnerability .... This cry from
the depths of another's fate arouses and excites us, mobilizes our
longing to transcend our own subjectivity . . . - we suddenly find
ourselves compelled to identify with Being, and we fall into our
own responsibility. 28
If in others' vulnerability, we not only see our own, but "identify with
Being," and thus "fall into our own responsibility," we are not moved final-
ly to solidarity by recognition, we do not find solidarity prescribed by
recognition; rather, it is innate in us. Havel wrote, "[Riesponsibility for
others is something primal and vitally important ... by virtue of which we
transcend ourselves from the beginning . . . ."29 Similarly, Joseph Conrad's
evocation of solidarity captures its descriptive, rather than normative, sig-
nificance. He wrote of "the subtle but invincible, conviction of solidarity
that knits together the loneliness of innumerable hearts, to the solidarity in
dreams, in joy, in sorrow, in aspirations, in illusions, in hope, in fear, which
binds men to each other, which binds together all humanity-the dead to
the living and the living to the unborn." 30 This "conviction of solidarity"
connects us to the category of the "human" and thus to the essential princi-
ple of international human rights, universality.
Solidarity, in its transcendence of self, in "bind[ing] together all humani-
ty," does not deny the diversity of the world. To the contrary, solidarity
calls on us to pay resolute, close attention to that diversity, to find within
the complex human mosaic what we hold in common. The Nigerian writer
27. VACLAv HAVEL, LETTERS To OLGA 323 (1988), 1 am grateful to my student Paul Linden-
Retek for introducing me to Havel's reflections in these letters.
28. Id. at 324.
29. Id. at 322-23.
30. Joseph Conrad, Preface to THE NIGGER OF THE NARCISSUS (1897), available at
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/
17731/17731-h/17731-h.htm. I am grateful to Stephen Ackley-Ortiz for pointing me to Conrad's
Preface.
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Chimamanda Adichie, in her speech, "The Danger of a Single Story," spoke
of the human tendency to see in another person or another place a single
story.
I have always felt that it is impossible to engage properly with a
place or a person without engaging with all of the stories of that
place or that person. The consequence of the single story is this: It
robs people of dignity. It makes our recognition of our equal hu-
manity difficult. It emphasizes how we are different rather than
how we are similar.3'
In emphasizing the danger of the single story, Adichie exhorts
us to recognize in our mutual complexity and diversity the way in
which we are deeply similar. To recognize "our equal humanity" is
to acknowledge the fact of solidarity, which embraces, rather than
erases, our complex diversity. It is the fact that requires a univer-
salist orientation and a duty, within our multiplicity, to seek hu-
manity in the other.
If human rights are not universal, if they do not belong to all people
solely because they are humans, they cannot function as rights, available to
all to invoke as a demand for justice. I do not want to wade into the murky
marsh of debate about the sources of human rights and the extent to which
claims of universality are justified. As an advocate, I take the universality
of human rights as a necessity for the efficacy of human rights as a tool for
achieving social justice. Without the principle of universality, human rights
cannot be a legitimate source of legal demands or of people's or move-
ments' political demands for justice. The extent to which there is global
consensus that any particular right is universal is an issue that calls for fur-
ther discourse. Nevertheless, the principle of universality derives directly
from the fact of solidarity. And just as the full extent of what all humans
have in common is indeterminate, the full extent of rights to which we can
ascribe universality remains unsettled. In understanding the content of
universality as a dynamic and troubled matter, Makau Mutua has cogently
defined the problem and laid out the course for a project of true universali-
zation of human rights:
The universalization of human rights cannot succeed unless the
corpus [of human rights] is moored in all the cultures of the world.
Ideas do not become universal merely because powerful interests
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declare them to be so. Inclusion not exclusion is the key to legiti-
macy.32
While criticizing the Western presumption of universality claims for the
current corpus of human rights, Mutua does not reject the value of univer-
sality as a principle underlying human rights as a set of norms and political
arrangements aimed at "the reduction, if not the elimination, of conditions
that perpetuate human indignity, violence, poverty, and powerlessness."33
He puts the notion of universality in a more complex context than the one
that tends to be comfortably accepted by actors brought up within the hu-
man rights tradition.
Just over half a century after the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights laid the foundation for the human rights movement, diverse
peoples have embraced those ideas across the earth. That fact is
undeniable. But it is only part of the story. Those same people
who have embraced that corpus also seek to contribute to it, at
times by radically reformulating it, at others by tinkering at the
margins.M
Mutua's critique of human rights universality claims is consistent with
Daniel's analysis of a pervasive Northern domination of clinical human
rights collaboration. Both have at their core a Northern arrogance, what
Makau refers to in this chapter and elsewhere as "the pathology of the sav-
ior mentality."35 Whether one accepts claims of the established universality
of human rights or, with Mutua, views universality as a goal to be achieved
through an inclusive global discourse, universality is an essential principle
of human rights that not only provides the grounds for demands for justice,
but also must guide the work of advocates.
V. THE CONFLUENCE OF SOLIDARITY AND UNIVERSALITY: EMBRACING THE
IMPERATIVE OF EMPATHY AND THE HUMILITY OF ITS INEVITABLE FAILURE
Solidarity is a fact: the reality of human life and its inevitable boundary.
Universality is the legal embodiment of the fact of solidarity, necessary to
make rights susceptible of justice claims and consistent protection across
32. Makau Mutua, The Complexity of Universalism in Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS WITH
MODESTY: THE PROBLEM OF UNIVERSALISM 51, 63 (Andrbs Saj6 ed., 2004). Mutua argues for an
inclusive process of global conversation to achieve universalization of a "new corpus [that]
must discard the false premises of the current corpus and reject its excesses, while building on
those of its notions which have the potential for genuine universality." Id. at 64.
33. Id. at 57.
34. Id. at 54.
35. See, e.g., id. at 58.
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arbitrary divisions. In the conduct of human rights clinics, with solidarity
the fact that generates clinical education's commitment to social justice and
universality the principle that makes rights rights, empathy is the inevitable
offspring, the required governing attitude for all interaction with others. At
the confluence of solidarity and universality is the imperative of empathy.
Is empathy any more of an imperative in the human rights clinic than in the
more traditional legal services clinic? The centrality to human rights of the
principle of universality adds a dimension to the clinical commitment to so-
cial justice: It necessarily entails knowledge of solidarity and the mutuality
of regard it demands. 36
Empathy requires something of us. It involves seeking to identify with
other peoples' conditions, to understand those conditions from the others'
perspectives. The expression of this responsibility toward the other as an
imperative of empathy has ancient roots. The Old Testament contains
many references to the duty to protect, defend, or support the widow, the
orphan, the poor, and the stranger. These references are in the language of
duty and even of law:
"When you beat the olives from your trees, do not go over the
branches a second time. Leave what remains for the foreigner, the
fatherless and the widow.."3
"Cursed is the man who withholds justice from the alien, the fa-
therless or the widow."38
"[L]earn to do right! Seek justice, encourage the oppressed. De-
fend the cause of the fatherless, plead the case of the widow."39
Moses's command to the Israelites as he redelivered the Ten Com-
mandments, "Remember that you were slaves in Egypt, and follow careful-
ly these decrees," 40 is a radical statement of solidarity and the imperative of
empathy.
36. This may suggest that we should subject North-South clinical human rights collaboration
to higher expectations of equality than the expectations we might have for other forms of clini-
cal collaboration. Although Daniel separates various forms of cooperation and has a special
focus on collaborative human rights fact-finding missions, his analysis lumps together cooper-
ative efforts that involve human rights clinicians of the North and efforts that involve North-
ern clinicians whose work addresses local problems. The imperative of empathy, especially
when combined with human rights clinical teachers' interest in and experience with interna-
tional matters and working across cultures, would lead to a greater expectation of equality in
North-South cooperative human rights clinical relationships.
37. Deuteronomy 24:21 (NIV).
38. Deuteronomy 27:19 (NIV).
39. Isaiah 1:17 (NIV).
40. Deuteronomy 16:12 (NIV) (emphasis added).
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Empathy requires effort, but it also requires the knowledge that the ef-
fort always fails. The identification with the other that is empathy's object
is, at best, partially achievable, because we can never fully know and expe-
rience the other within her complex intersecting layers of circumstance.
Empathy, as an inevitably failed effort at identification with the other, car-
ries with it a component of humility, a recognition that we are ultimately
incapable of totally occupying the place of the other. But empathy relies on
the effort to do so, not on the ultimate success of that effort. The real-world
work of a human rights clinic forces the abstract universal of principle, of
all human beings, of Being, to merge with the particular of a specific indi-
vidual or group in a way that demands the effort to put oneself in the place
of the other and the humility to know that identification will, at best, be
partial. But we can move asymptotically toward identification. As Samuel
Beckett wrote, "Ever tried. Ever failed. No matter. Try again. Fail again. Fail
better." 41 That is the imperative of empathy. To act without making the ef-
fort is dangerous. To act without humility is more dangerous. 42
VI. INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY: APPLYING PRINCIPLES TO PRACTICE
Daniel's three principles, "mutual recognition; consensus in establish-
ing, interpreting and transforming the rules that guide the project; and pri-
oritizing the social justice objective over purposes of professional develop-
ment and educational growth," 43 find a stronger foundation in the
understanding of solidarity and the imperative of empathy that derive from
the universality principle of human rights and the social-justice commit-
ment of clinical education. Also, empathy, in its effort to identify with the
other and in its humility, can help elaborate Daniel's principles and suggest
others. Northern clinical teachers collaborating with Southern counterparts
in advocacy projects addressing Southern local human rights issues should
listen to and take their lead from the needs of local actors. So should
Southern clinical teachers, who have a North-South relationship with the
people on whose behalf they seek to advocate; this relationship, too, should
be guided by empathy. Fact-finding projects should focus on narrow issues
for which necessarily brief collaborative investigative missions can obtain.
useful information and avoid Northern appropriation of Southern
knowledge.
The three motives Daniel identifies for clinical cooperation-advancing
social justice, educating students and clinical teachers' professional ad-
41. SAMUEL BECKE'r, WORSTWARD Ho 7 (1983).
42. The requirement of humility resonates with Makau Mutua's critique of universality and, in
particular, his rejection of the "savior mentality." His call for realizing universality through
inclusive, respectful discourse is, in fact, consistent with a notion of universality based on soli-
darity.
43. Bonilla, supra note 1, at 212.
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vancement-must be assigned appropriate priorities. Where selecting pro-
jects requires choosing among many possibilities, all of which have poten-
tial to similarly advance social justice, the selection should respect the
teacher's duty to educate students and, thus, consider pedagogical criteria.
Once a project is chosen, implementation should be guided primarily by
constant assessment of what will achieve the best possible social-justice re-
sult. The professional advancement of teachers should be a by-product of
principled decisions about pedagogy and increasing social justice and
should never enter into those decisions. Following the imperative of empa-
thy will ensure at least one result: judgments about advancing social justice
and teaching and inspiring students to advance social justice will vanquish
pure self-interest.
VII. CONCLUSION: ESCAPING STRUCTURAL DETERMINISM, HOLDING
OURSELVES ACCOUNTABLE
Daniel accounts for a reality or part of a reality, not the reality. It invites
further reflection to help us understand why some instances of South-North
clinical collaboration appear to overcome the dynamic of domination and
subordination that Daniel has observed. Daniel acknowledges that some
collaborative projects involve clinics of the South and North working as
equal partners, and he uses words like "often" and "many" and "much"
when he describes the domination-subordination dynamic. But the struc-
tural nature of his analysis suggests a story of "usually" and "most" -an
inexorable process along a path to inequality. To take the exceptions to the
dynamic of Northern domination and Southern subordination seriously re-
quires us to understand what enables them. Joining the human rights prin-
ciple of universality with the commitment of clinical education to inspire
students to use law to pursue social justice pushes the fact of solidarity to
the heart of the international human rights clinical enterprise and imposes
on its practitioners an imperative of empathy. When we fail to act accord-
ing to the imperative of empathy, we ultimately fail as individuals, affected
by our complex individual constellations of attitudes, ego, interests, beliefs,
strengths and weaknesses, including, yes, our place in the North-South dy-
namic. Without considering the role of the imperative of empathy and the
human capacity to embrace it, we risk giving into a powerful tyranny of
geographic and historical determinism.
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